

Google Strategic Partnership with Activision Blizzard King (ABK)

Attorney Client Privileged Dec 2019

> Privileged and Confidential



GOOG-PLAY-007173346

This document is now locked

It was presented to BC on Dec 18th 2019

The general structure and the amounts were approved

Please reach out to a or Marc Theermann with questions

Executive Summary - ABK

Deal Overview:

Our Play, Cloud, Ads, and YouTube leadership teams are excited to put forth this xPA deal with one of the most important game publishers in the world. Activision Blizzard King (ABK) is part of the target list of 22 developers approved by BC for Project Hug. Purpose of this deal: solidify Play relationship and provide further xPA incentivisation and velocity.

Opportunity to secure a competitive \$230M GCP commit for greenfield account, make sure Activision continues to grow on Play, receive agreement to launch on Stadia, and attain exclusive Esports license.

Guarantees to Google:

- Continued Play partnership for ABK titles; Standard Hug developer obligations + Consumer Spend commitment
- \$230M Cloud commitment over 3-4 years
- \$345M in Ads spend commitment over 3 years
- Exclusive eSports distribution license for YouTube
- Commitment to partner on Stadia (deal terms TBD)

Guarantees to ABK (for each of 3 years):

- GCP credits equal to 2% of Play consumer spend (no cap)
- UAC Matching credits: \$1UAC ads credit for every \$3 ABK spends in UAC (\$35M/year cap)
- Co-marketing funds: \$1 in co-marketing funding for every \$3 of ABK marketing spend (\$20M/year cap)
- eSports Licensing: \$45M for exclusive eSports distribution license for YouTube

- Our Play, Cloud, Ads, and YouTube leadership teams are excited to put forth this xPA deal with one of the most important game publishers in the world, Activision Blizzard King (ABK).
- This deal would solidify our Play relationship and ABK's commitment to our platform, cement a premier top gaming partner on Cloud, increase
 our gaming ads revenue, and bring an important source of gaming content to YouTube.

Slide 3

1

Redacted - Privilege

Karen Aviram Beatty, 12/18/2019

2 _Marked as resolved_

Karen Aviram Beatty, 12/18/2019

2 _Re-opened_

Henry So, 12/18/2019

- This may change our analysis and I have operational concerns as well. Can we discuss please before we present to BC?

 Henry So, 12/18/2019
- 1 will ping you over GVC

Marc Theermann, 12/18/2019

1 Would we be able to discuss the ads commit piece, particularly how we plan to execute in the event they do not meet it?

Henry So, 12/18/2019

2


Redacted - Privilege

We also discussed the manual nature of the execution of this deal, and the operational challenges. We will likely need additional resources this and other deals like this.

Marc Theermann, 12/18/2019

Recap: BC approved Games Velocity Program ("Project Hug")

Play funded program to unlock Google value to 22 top game developers Google Goals: Titles sim ship on Play, xPA upsell, improved ecosystem sentiment



- Product determined we'd be able to absorb \$300M-\$500M credits on UAC without adversely affecting the auction
- Based on this, we don't believe the ABK deal should pose any risk to the overall auction



Activision Google partnership: requiring BC approval

	Google Gets	Google Gives	BC approval required for
Cloud	\$230M commit over 3-4 years Grow ABK business on GCP + Migrate their entire enterprise to G-Suite in 2020 + ABK agrees to public endorsement	~\$60M GCP credits over 3 years Credits equal to 2% of Play consumer spend (no cap)	BC approved under Hug
Ads	Grow ads revenue By incentivizing UAC spend via matching credits. ABK willing to commit \$115M/year in min ad spend	Max \$105M Ads matching credits over 3 years \$1 credit for every \$3 ABK spends in UAC Max amount = \$35M/year (We would terminate the current King Hug deal)	2 year extension of Hug (\$35M in Year 2 & \$35M in Year 3)
Play	Mitigate risk on Play store Ensure SIM-ship of ABK titles, commitment to our retail environment, and Play prioritization. Address Play Rev Share concern	Max \$60M co-marketing over 3 years \$1 credit for every \$3 ABK spends Max amount = \$20M/year	2 year extension of Hug (\$20M in Year 2 & \$20M in Year 3)
YouTube	Increase YT viewership By securing exclusive rights to Esports leagues	\$135M payment over 3 years Exclusive distribution license for Esports leagues (\$40/45/50 in years 1/2/3)	\$135M payment (\$85M from Cloud; \$22 from YT; \$28M from ???)

Google

Note: Ad Manager excluded due to separate contract negotiations, current deal expires February 2020

G Credits and Licensing Costs

\$115M: have already been approved by BC for Project Hug

\$245M: require BC approval for funding


		Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Total
\bigcirc	GCP Credits	\$20M	\$20M	\$20M	\$60M
^	UAC Matching Credits	\$35M	\$35M	\$35M	\$105M
	Co-Marketing	\$20M	\$20M	\$20M	\$60M
	Esports Licensing	\$40M	\$45M	\$50 M	\$135M
	Total	\$115M	\$120M	\$125M	\$360M

Google

- ABK wants \$45M more vs this proposal
- \$15M in GCP credits (2.5% of Play consumer spend) AND
- \$10M more per year for Esports licensing (\$50/55/60)



G PA willingness to pay for Esports license



Reason for Google to allocate these funds:

This deal helps to solidify ABK's commitment to our Play platform. cement a premier top gaming partner on Cloud, increase our gaming Ads revenue, and bring an important source of gaming content to YouTube.

Google



xPA Goals & Risks for Activision Deal

Create a deeper relationship with one of the largest gaming publishers in the world

		PA Goals	PA Risk	Potential revenue per year (at risk)
>	Play	Sim-ship: Launch ABK titles on Play on 'Day 1' of mobile launch Title Parity: Maintain game feature/content parity across mobile platforms Quality: Maintain high quality (4.0 star)	Activision has told us that they will build their own mobile store. Tencent portfolio exploring other business models to take revenues off Play. Epic's side loading Fortnite launcher turned into Epic Mobile Game store.	Est. \$243M per year (Alternative business models might create slow drain, or irrational decisions might put more revenue at risk. King titles currently secured with 1 year Hug deal, which ends in 2020)
٨	Ads	Grow ads revenue by incentivizing UAC spend via matching credits	In a scenario where ABK pulls their games from the store, the mobile performance revenue would go to zero on Android and reduce on iOS	\$100M+ in 2020 (75% at risk. Some spending might remain, but more would move to other channels)
۵	Cloud	Growing ABK's business on GCP. Migrate enterprise to G-Suite in 2020 + ABK agrees to public endorsement	Lose important gaming client to AMZN	\$230M Commitment over 3 years (binary. 100% at risk)
	YouTube	Increase YT viewership by securing exclusive rights to Esports leagues & stop User Generated Content revenue share discussion	Current YT business largely untouched, but they could start claiming UGC or take down content. Twitch would continue to own gaming narrative	ABK gross revenue YTD for UGC content across their IP is \$45.8M [link]
5	Stadia	Drive Stadia adoption and player growth by securing AAA/high ROI content	Long-term gap in Stadia's content portfolio	

• Parity on a title by title basis?

Financial Summary

Contribution Margin by PA (before any transfers and x-PA allocations)

(\$M)	Contribution Margin	CM vs Hug	Comment
Play	\$680	-\$40	Hug terms extended for 2 years
Ads	\$281	-\$70	Hug terms extended for 2 years
Cloud	\$75	\$68	\$230M Cloud commit
YouTube	-\$113	-\$113	\$135M eSports licensing payment
TOTAL	\$923	-\$154	
Cloud / YT (combined) -\$37	-\$44	

Sensitivity Analysis: Contribution Margin of Cloud / YT (combined)												
(\$M)		Size of Cloud Commitment										
		150	200	230	275	300	325	345				
	45	\$9	\$36	\$53	\$77	\$90	\$104	\$115				
Fee	75	-\$21	\$6	\$23	\$47	\$60	\$74	\$85				
å	85	-\$31	-\$4	\$13	\$37	\$50	\$64	\$75				
YouTube	120	-\$66	-\$39	-\$22	\$2	\$15	\$29	\$40				
>	135	-\$81	-\$54	-\$37	-\$13	\$0	\$14	\$25				

Finance Summary PoV

- The value exchange of the proposed deal is negative relative to a standard Hug deal.
- However, ABK has stated that they will NOT sign a standalone Hug deal (when King deal expires in 2020).
- Therefore, whether or not to do this deal should hinge on (i) strategic value to Cloud above the revenue commitment and/or (ii) a belief that not doing a deal exposes Play to material risk
- Allocation to PAs of \$135m licensing payment is still tbd. We expect accounting assessment by Fri; initial estimate is 60+% to Cloud; <40% to Play.
- As an indication of value, it is instructive to understand how much each PA would be willing to contribute to fund the deal.
 Current inputs: Cloud - \$40-\$85m; YT - up to \$22m; and Play still evaluating; leaving a *funding gap* of ~\$28m
- YouTube revenue is based on speculative adtech that hasn't yet been built. Product delays or other shortfalls could decrease the \$22M that YouTube thinks it could earn from this content. (The momentum run rate of the revenue generation is \$3M.)

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Detailed Explanation of Deal Components


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EXHIBIT 151.R-011



Why is Activision Blizzard King important to Google Play

- One of strongest gaming IP portfolios & many are still coming to mobile
 - Candy Crush top grossing franchise in US app stores 2018 & 2019
 - O CoD best selling console game for 10+ years
 - World of Warcraft, Diablo, StarCraft, & Overwatch are all strong console & PC franchises with real mobile potential
- ABKs existing mobile franchises are high-performing & beloved by Android users
 - 377M installs, 245M MAU
 - \$761M consumer spend
 - O 5% of Play HVUs
- Strong performance forecasted through 2023; its in Play's best interest to secure ABK catalog for Android



• note : HVU = users who spend >\$1500 a year



Activision Blizzard King GCP deal

- The GCP commit is \$230M over 4 years. We believe the consumption will be much higher as ABKs budget (confirmed by CIO) is closer to \$1B over 4 years.
- First Tencent portfolio company on GCP
- ABK Global CIO, our key cloud executive (Jacques Erasmus), comes from King. We
 have a very strong relationship and he is inclined to work with GCP and publicly talk
 about GCP. King has already agreed to a public use case on their GCP usage. We
 would like to feature ABK at our cloud events to drive growth in the games vertical
 in cloud.
- AWS is currently their preferred cloud provider. Having the top 3 largest game publisher speak highly of their GCP implementation will help grow our cloud business in games.
- Amazon is positioning AWS + Twitch as their core value proposition and favorable commercials
- ABK CIO also open to drive full GSuite migration from O365 (\$2m / year)

Note:

 We believe that AWS is asking for a \$300M commitment over 3 years - possibly connected to a \$100M Twitch broadcasting licensing offer over 2 years

YouTube Content Licensing (Activision/Blizzard Esports)

- About: Despite the declines of Overwatch from a UGC perspective, the Overwatch and Call of Duty Esports league are cornerstones of the Esports industry, and a quintessential example of high end Esports productions. These leagues would be incredibly valuable to YouTube on an exclusive basis as part of our efforts to grow Live Gaming and Account Linking, but we have stayed away from acquiring these rights due to astronomical costs and have deferred to AMIP Live Gaming, and Account Linking as better investment paths.
- Ads (no improvements): All revenues on O&O channels would be recoupable, however, YouTube isn't inventory constrained in Gaming, and due to Brand Safety concerns, aren't monetizing Live like we do for Uploaded content. In addition to this, we are lacking significant ad product features that would allow us to maximize impressions across the content. Because of this, the ads recoupment is limited to only \$2.1M over the duration of the deal in its entirety.
- Ads (ad improvements): If YouTube was willing to commit by January 2021 to ad products such as DAI coverage, interest based ads, demand diversity, and ad podding, we could recoup up to \$31.4M over the duration of the deal. This assumes ad-tech work to improve monetization and as well as premium CPMs and STRs.
- Cost: \$135M over 3-years

RPH: Revenue per Hour



Detail Financial Models

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EXHIBIT 151.R-015

Accounting Operationalization Concerns

Risk factor	Explanation	Possible blocker?
Technical accounting assessment	 This deal is unprecedented in its complexity and xPA implications The payments to ABK for the YT eSports distribution rights, and potentially the Stadia-related payments, introduce a substantial amount of contra-revenue, and the exact contra-revenue allocation is not yet finalized (expected to be borne by Cloud and Play at this time) Due to expanded segment reporting from Project Sushi, there will be an increased need to reflect each PA's revenue/margins accurately Alphabet Technical Accounting and EY are engaged, but finalizing the proper accounting assessment will take time and current thinking could change based on the final contractual terms 	Yes (if results are unacceptable to impacted PAs)
Entity (mis)alignment	Redacted - Privilege	Yes
Manual support	 There is no automated solution in place that supports xPA transactions Properly accounting for this deal, and supporting it, will be extremely manual and time-intensive Additional HC may be required by impacted PAs 	No (pending resources)

Google

Ads Finance Model

CASE	BASE	BASE	BASE	BASE	BASE
(\$M)	2020	2021	2022	2023	2020-2023
Play Spend	\$810	\$830	\$810	\$790	\$3,240
Ads - Non-UAC Spend	\$55	\$69	\$81	\$91	\$296
Ads - UAC Spend NOT eligible for Credits	\$5	\$7	\$8	\$10	\$30
Ads - UAC Spend eligible for Credits	\$96	\$127	\$160	\$192	\$575
Total Ads Spend	\$156	\$203	\$249	\$293	\$901
Ads payments to 3rd-parties - Aggregate	\$66	\$85	\$105	\$123	\$378
Ads Cost to Serve (TI & Other)	\$23	\$30	\$37	\$44	\$135
Ads Contribution Margin (pre-credits)	\$67	\$87	\$107	\$126	\$387
Ads Contribution Margin (pre-credits) % of Spend	43%	43%	43%	43%	43%
Ads - DVIP Credits	\$0.4	\$1.5	\$1.5	\$1.5	\$4.9
Ads - UAC Credits	\$32	\$35	\$35	\$0	\$102
Ads Contribution Margin (post-credits)	\$35	\$51	\$71	\$124	\$281
Ads Contribution Margin (post-credits) % of Spend	22%	25%	28%	42%	31%
Ads - UAC Credits already funded by Hug	\$32	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$32
Ads Contribution Margin Impact vs. Hug	\$0	-\$35	-\$35	\$0	-\$70

Summary:

- Ads Revenue Assumes business as usual revenue growth; no incremental upside assumed as part of the deal.
- Current volume of credits estimates a 12% loss in contribution margin vs no deal over 4 year period
- Based on current revenue projections, deal would max out on credits in year 1 itself, leaving no incentive for growth beyond year 1

Assumptions:

- Ads Revenue Revenue projections based on a weighted average forecast based on momentum, business plan and sales input, with some deceleration in successive years and a 5 yr CAGR of 20%
- UAC credits assumed to be at the hug approved 33%, capped at \$35M per year. No credit in year 4.
- TAC assumptions based on 2019 product mix and 2019 average TAC by product
- Contribution margin does not take into account the impact of other incentives outside of Hug and direct client DVIP

Slide 16

Seems like a negative view of the situation. Can we clarify this comment to better reflect the reality. The Credits have a max amount that can be accumulated per year. Each year the client has to spend this amount to get the credits. So the incentive stays the same each year. It does not decrease. It is true that the incentive for growth is not captured, but the reason for that is that we were not allowed to do a DVIP for multiple years on top of this deal (as DVIPs are 1 year only).

Marc Theermann, 12/18/2019

- Hi Marc I am happy to chat live, but I believe this is just a transparent view from an ads POV. I acknowledge that there are x PA benefits for this deal and that ads benefits are not a key point of the deal. Just putting some points down here for you to consider.
 - 1. Whether we do a DVIP deal or not, the release of these \$35M in credits is not dependent on the client meeting those DVIP commitments. The only thing they lose if they don't meet their DVIP commit is the \$400K \$1.5M in DIF.
 - 2. To put things in perspective, ABK has \$112M in ads revenue this year. \$100M if I only count non search which is comparable to DVIP commits.

We are saying we will drive a \$115M commitment per year. In 2020, this is an increase of \$15M vs \$35M in credits, so Google will lose margin in effect.

For year 2 and 3, the \$115M = 0% over previous years, and yet they will unlock the \$35M.

Hence the point that they don't really have to grow vs 2019 to unlock their full credits Rekha Natarajan, 12/18/2019

Play Finance Model (without xPA transfers) Key callouts:

CASE	BASE	BASE	BASE	BASE	BASE
(SM)	2020	2021	2022	2023	2020-2023
Play Spend	\$810	\$830	\$810	\$790	\$3,240
Play payments to 3rd-parties Play Cost to Serve (TI & Other)	\$567 \$58	\$581 \$60	\$567 \$58	\$553 \$57	\$2,268 \$232
Play Contribution Margin (pre-investment)	\$185	\$189	\$185	\$180	\$740
Play Contribution Margin (pre-investment) % of Spend	23%	23%	23%	23%	23%
Play Contribution Margin (pre-investment) % of Play Rever	76%	76%	76%	76%	76%
Play - co-marketing investment	\$20	\$20	\$20	\$0	\$60
Play Contribution Margin (post-investment)	\$165	\$169	\$165	\$180	\$680
Play Contribution Margin (post-investment) % of Spend	20%	20%	20%	23%	21%
Play Contribution Margin (post-investment) % of Play Reve	68%	68%	68%	76%	70%
Play - investment already funded by Hug	\$27	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$27
Play Contribution Margin Impact vs. Hug	\$7	-\$20	-\$20	\$0	-\$33
					I

- Play Spend: forecasted spend from ABK on Play
 - a. Driven by new title launches and existing title follow a decline curve
 - b. 85% of spend driven by King
 - -25% to +35% range variability on 4 year spend
- 2. Play payments to 3rd parties: 70% payout to developers as part of rev share
- 3. Play cost to serve includes payment processing fees, customer support and Technical Infra costs
- 4. Incremental \$33 M ask over 2020-2023
 - a. Current proposal of \$60 M (\$20 M/year) in Play co-marketing
 - b. Hug funded one-year investment of \$27 M in co-marketing, eSports events, YT Presence grants & Ads SVA
- 5. Pure program economics view, does not reflect impact of GCP & UAC credits on Play P&L

Cloud Finance Model (without xPA P&L transfers)

	BASE	BASE	BASE	BASE	BASE
(\$M)	2020	2021	2022	2023	2020-23
Play Spend	\$810	\$830	\$810	\$790	\$3,240
Cloud Spend - Gross	\$47	\$78	\$110	\$125	\$361
Cloud Spend Discount	36%	36%	36%	36%	
Cloud Spend - Net	\$30	\$50	\$70	\$80	\$230
Cloud Cost to Serve (TI & Other)	\$14	\$23	\$32	\$37	\$106
Cloud Contribution Margin (pre-credits)	\$16	\$27	\$38	\$43	\$124
Cloud C. Margin (pre-credits) % of Net Spend	53%	54%	54%	54%	54%
Cloud - Credits (for years 1-3 ONLY)	\$16	\$17	\$16	\$0	\$49
Cloud Contribution Margin (post-credits)	\$0	\$10	\$22	\$43	\$75
Cloud C. Margin (pre-credits) % of Net Spend	-1%	21%	31%	54%	33%

Discounts: 36% average (50% GCP Network; 22% EDP; 25% Compute VM, 15% Storage): needed to compete vs AWS

Net Revenue: \$230m (not factoring possible spend beyond commit); back- loaded ramp is standard for GCP.

Cost to Serve: Technical infrastructure for client's usage

Gross Margin: 54%, close to 2019 GCP P&L average (52%)

Credits: \$49m Hug credits over 3 years; no credits in year 4. Note: these credits will be recognized as Cloud revenue (Play>Cloud transfer)

Not factoring possible contrarevenue for eSports Licenses costs

Cloud Finance Margin sensitivity (with xPA P&L transfers)

Deal Davenus		1	e200m; /	e220mc/	6220m. /	¢220mc /	¢E20m; /	¢E20== /
Deal Revenue (counts Hug credits as Revenue)			4 years	\$230m /		\$230m /	\$520m / 4-5 y	\$520m / 4-5 y
(before YT contra	,		4 years	4 years	4 years	4 years	4-5 y	4-5 y
Discount on GCP N			70%	70%	60%	50%	70%	50%
eSports licence cost in GCP P&L								
\$0	Rev		200	230	230	230	520	520
	Cost to serve		123	141	119	106	317	239
	GM		77	89	111	124	203	281
	GM %		39%	39%	48%	54%	39%	54%
\$43	Rev		157	187	187	187	477	477
	Cost to serve		123	141	119	106	317	239
	GM		34	46	68	81	160	238
	GM %		22%	25%	36%	43%	34%	50%
\$64	Rev		136	166	166	166	456	456
	Cost to serve		123	141	119	106	317	239
	GM		13	25	47	60	139	217
	GM %		10%	15%	28%	36%	30%	48%
\$85	Rev		115	145	145	145	435	435
	Cost to serve		123	141	119	106	317	239
	GM		-8	4	26	39	118	196
	GM %		-7%	3%	18%	27%	27%	45%
\$135	Rev		65	95	95	95	385	385
	Cost to serve		123	141	119	106	317	239
	GM		-58	-46	-24	-11	68	146
	GM %		-89%	-48%	-25%	-11%	18%	38%

Base case (\$230m/4y, 50% discount on Network): GCP Gross Margin is acceptable if Cloud carries <\$85m of the eSports licenses costs

Low case (\$200m/4y, 70% discount on Network): GCP Gross Margin is acceptable if Cloud carries <\$43m of the eSports licenses costs.

High case (\$520m/4-5y, 50% discount on Network): aggressive: implies client increases commit, and/or overspends vs commit (typical commit client spends ~1.3x), possible +1y extension. Then: GCP Gross Margin is solid even if Cloud carries the full \$135m.

Preliminary Technical Accounting assessment: Cloud likely to carry 60%-100% of costs (\$81M to \$135M)

Hug credits are recognized as Cloud revenue (Play>Cloud transfer)
Not factoring other Cloud products: PSO/Support (expected at low margin), G Suite (TBC in 2020).

Scenarios in red are not recommended
Scenarios in yellow are acceptable

Discounts on other products: 22% EDP, 25% on Compute VM , 15% on Storage. All scenarios assume ~\$49m of Hug credits over 3y (with Play>Cloud Revenue transfer); currently counted as 100% revenue (might go down to 95%). Not assuming that client might overspend vs commit.



Activision Blizzard King YouTube Deal: Deal Model With ad tech improvements

Economics		Ad tech im	provements			Summary
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Total		
Watch Time Hours	77 M	96 M	120 M	292 M		Commitment to build hybrid
Livestream	61 M	77 M	96 M	234 M	DAI	client/server based implementation to
VOD	15 M	19 M	24 M	58 M	Coverage	improve device coverage.
Revenue per hour	\$0.01	\$0.07	\$0.13	\$0.08	1	Currently building contactual doma
Livestream	\$0.01	\$0.08	\$0.15	\$0.15	Interest	Currently building contextual demo labelling system in combination with
VOD	\$0.02	\$0.02	\$0.02	\$0.02	Based Ads	growing direct sold demand.
Revenue	\$0.9 M	\$6.5 M	\$15.0 M	\$22.4 M	1	Dadicate product/ENC offerts to
Livestream	\$0.5 M	\$6.1 M	\$14.4 M	\$21.1 M	Serving	Dedicate product/ENG efforts to optimize existing ads infrastructure
VOD	\$0.3 M	\$0.4 M	\$0.5 M	\$1.3 M	Efficiency	for Live Sports
CAC	\$0.9 M	\$6.5 M	\$15.0 M	\$22.4 M	1	Harris and a great to a constant
YT Budget	\$0.4 M	\$0.2 M	\$0.0 M	\$0.6 M	Demand	Heavy sales push to accelerate growth of non-skip 15 second demand
Other PA Budget	\$44.1 M	\$38.5 M	\$30.0 M	\$112.6 M	diversity	across Reserve and Auction, not limited to sports.
YT Margin %	0%	0%	0%	0%	1	

Assumes ad-tech work to improve monetization (ad podding) and as well as premium CPMs and STRs For livestream ad tech improvement assumptions see slide For monetization statistics and comp set see slide

- RPH: Revenue per Hour
- Year 1 is calendar year 2020



Global Partnerships

Appendix

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Financial Summary: Appendix

Google / ABK x-PA Deal Financials (\$M)	BASE 2020		BASE 2022		BASE 2020-2023
Gross Revenue					
Play	\$810	\$830	\$810	\$790	\$3,240
Ads	\$156		\$249	\$293	\$901
Cloud	\$47	\$78	\$110	\$125	\$361
YouTube	\$1	\$7	\$15	\$0	\$23
Total	\$1,014	\$1,118	\$1,184	\$1,209	\$4,524
Contribution Margin (post incentives & costs to serve) Play Ads Cloud YouTube Total	\$165 \$35 \$0 -\$39	\$51 \$10	\$165 \$71 \$22 -\$35	\$180 \$124 \$43 \$0 \$348	\$680 \$281 \$75 -\$113 \$923
Contribution Margin Impact vs. Hug Play Ads Cloud YouTube Total	\$0 \$0 -\$1 -\$39	-\$20 -\$35 \$10 -\$39	-\$20 -\$35 \$23 -\$35	\$0 \$0 \$37 \$0 \$37	-\$40 -\$70 \$68 -\$113



Activision Blizzard King Stadia deal for potential inclusion in X-PA deal

Background

Strategic Partnership - Current Status

- ABK is gating Stadia negotiations on first closing this xGoogle deal
- The ultimate goal of a long-term partnership with Stadia and ABK is to bring ABK's top IP to Stadia (Call of Duty, Overwatch, World of Warcraft, Diablo)
- Stadia is currently targeting a small but key one-game deal to start laying the foundation for a broader strategic partnership with ABK

Deal Model

- Total direct deal contribution expected to be -13% ROI (-\$0.6M) in Base case due to uncertain Stadia overall Platform growth
- Deal structure: \$5M recoupable MG w/ \$3M in marketing value to approximate 85/15 effective rev share
 - ABK has made it clear that Stadia unit economics must be at parity or better than what they receive from other consoles
- Tony Hawk series sold ~11M copies through early 2000s console generations. Another recent ABK remaster from that same generation, Crash Bandicoot NSane Trilogy, sold 10M copies over two years (2018-2019).
- Deal model does not capture overall benefit of bringing ABK to Stadia, and potentially advancing Stadia portfolio needs to bring their top premium IP to help grow the user base

Financial Summary

Tony Hawk 2020	Low	Base	High
Global Unit Sales (M)	2.50	2.50	2.50
Stadia Unit Sales (M)	0.05	0.09	0.12
Stadia Sales Capture	2%	4%	5%
ASP + Add-on Content (\$)	\$50	\$50	\$50
Gross Revenue (\$M)	\$2.6	\$4.4	\$6.1
Partner Royalty (\$M)	\$0.0	\$0.0	\$0.0
Stadia Net Rev (\$M)	\$2.6	\$4.4	\$6.1
NRE (\$M)	\$0.0	\$0.0	\$0.0
Recoupable Advance (\$M)	-\$5.0	-\$5.0	-\$5.0
Deal contribution (\$M)	-\$2.4	-\$0.6	\$1.1
% ROI on Commitment	-48%	-13%	22%
MG Shortfall (\$M)	-\$2.8	-\$1.1	\$0.0
Stadia Player Attach%	1%	1%	2%

• https://www.statista.com/statistics/321374/global-all-time-unit-sales-call-of-duty-games/

Slide 23

1 Shanna Preve@google.com @google.com @google.com FYI this is in the deck in the appendix currently

Michael Buckley, 12/18/2019



Credits and Licensing Costs - what ABK "wants"

Everything highlighted is an increased number vs our proposal for BC review

	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Total	vs BC ask
GCP Credits UAC	<mark>\$25M</mark>	<mark>\$25M</mark>	<mark>\$25M</mark>	<mark>\$75M</mark>	\$15
Credits	\$35M	\$35M	\$35M	\$105M	-
Co-Marketing	\$20M	\$20M	\$20M	\$60M	-
Esports	¢EOM.	ecc.	¢.oM	014 EN A	\$30M
Licensing	\$50W	\$29IVI	\$60M	<u>\$1021AI</u>	\$30IVI
Total	\$130M	\$135 M	\$140 M	<mark>\$405M</mark>	\$45M
	GCP Credits UAC Matching Credits Co-Marketing Esports Licensing	GCP Credits \$25M UAC Matching Credits \$35M Co-Marketing \$20M Esports Licensing \$50M	GCP Credits \$25M \$25M UAC Matching Credits \$35M \$35M Co-Marketing \$20M \$20M Esports Licensing \$50M \$55M	GCP Credits \$25M \$25M \$25M UAC Matching Credits \$35M \$35M \$35M \$35M Co-Marketing \$20M \$20M \$20M Esports Licensing \$50M \$55M \$60M	GCP Credits \$25M \$25M \$75M UAC Matching Credits \$35M \$35M \$105M Co-Marketing \$20M \$20M \$60M Esports Licensing \$50M \$55M \$60M \$165M



Overview of Activision Blizzard King



Company Overview

- Headquarters: Santa Monica, CA
- Employees: 9,900 FTEs and part-time employees as of 12/31/18 (likely closer to 9,000 after Q1 '19 restructuring)
- User Metrics:
 - o Candy Crush Franchise

 $\circ xx$

Hearthstone

 \circ XXX

o Call of Duty Mobile

Description:

- Lead global developer and publisher of interactive entertainment content & services
- Develops and distributes content and services on video game consoles, PC, and mobile devices
- Operates eSports events & leagues and creates film and television content based on their games

Select I	Members o	f the Managem	ent Team				
Name	Current Role	Experi	ence				
Bobby Kotick	CEO	CEO for last 25+ yea Grown Activision Bli member of S&P 500 Fortune's "100	izzard to be				
Coddy Johnson	President & COO of Blizzard	 Longtime employee leadership positions Rejoined Blizzard in 	2008-2016				
Armin Zerza	Chief Commercial Officer	Current role since Feb 2019, prior served as COO and CFO 11 yrs at P&G as CFO of Latin America					
Jacques Erasmus	Global CIO						
Brand		Select Key Franc	hises				
ACTIVISION	•	CALL DUTY	!				
BUZZARD	WARE	HEARTHS TONE	DVERWATCH				
Tring.	C _m	Bubble Witch ²	Heroes				
			Privileged and				

Privileged and Confidential

Slide 25

- 4 Lawrence: Perhaps we add some new user metrics and Call of Duty Mobile success.

 Marc Theermann, 12/4/2019
- 1 Emily Putze agoogle.com can you please add user metrics (DAUs, LTD downloads, etc) for CoD Mobile, Hearthstone, and the Candy Crush Franchise (suggest rolling up all of the different Candy games into 1 aggregate stat)

 Lawrence Koh, 12/4/2019



Corporate ATVI performance

Quarterly Revenue (\$M, YoY%)	'18 Q1	'18 Q2	'18 Q3	'18 Q4	'19 Q1	'19 Q2	'19 Q3
Product sales	720 (42%)	464 (- 4 %)	263 (- 32%)	808 (10%)	656 (-9%)	359 (-23%)	260 (-1%)
Subscription, licensing, and other revenues	1,245 (2%)	1,177 (2%)	1,249 (1%)	1,573 (20%)	1,169 (- 6%)	1,037 (-12%)	1,022 (-18%)
Revenue by Platform							
Console	817	565	347	808	677	407	241
PC	519	451	482	727	494	361	341
Mobile & ancillary ¹	536	521	523	596	535	511	525
Other ²	93	104	160	250	119	117	175
MAUs							
Activision	51	45	46	53	41	37	36
Blizzard	38	37	37	35	32	32	33
King	285	270	262	268	272	258	247
Total	374	352	345	356	345	327	316

- Activision: still feeling effects of disposition of Destiny in Dec 2018, plus lower sales of CoD catalog titles (CoD Mobile not captured here)
- Blizzard: declines due to lack of WoW release and underperformance of recent Hearthstone expansion
- King: Candy Crush MAU continuing to decline. However, cites lower digital storefront fees (Apple and Google) as one reason for higher operating income despite lower MAU and revenue
- Still expect increasing amount of sales to be concentrated in fewer franchises (e.g. more focus on building out existing rather than creating new)
- Mix between product sales and subscription/licensing/other is seasonal, but generally falls between 20-35% Product, 65-80% Subscription

Google :m

Imobile devices, toys, accessories, and physical merchandise Prevenue from studios and distribution businesses and MLG Privileged and Confidential

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5 Will move to appendix for BC. Will be used to get internal alignment before BC.

Marc Theermann, 12/6/2019



$Partnership\,Revenue\ \ ({\tt Actual\,\&\,Aspirational\,Estimate})$

	20 ⁻	18	H1 2019		2019 (Annualized)		Aspirational 2020* (30% growth over 2 year & Hug++)	
	Google Net Rev.	Partner Net Rev.	Google Net Rev.	Partner Net Rev.	Google Net Rev.	Partner Net Rev.	Google Net Rev.	Partner Net Rev.
Play	239.1m	538.2m	111.4m	268.1m	222.9m	536.2m	255.8m	707.3m
Buy-side: Search	10.0m		3.5m		7.1m		13.0m	
Buy-side: Display/Video	64.0m		42.2m		84.5m		109.1m	
Google Cloud	2.8m		2.1m		4.2m		124.6m	
Sell-side: Ad Manager King (with game ads in 2020)	3.8m	19.5m	8.5m	21.4m	17.0m	42.9m	15.0m	85.0m
Sell-side: Ad Manager Activision & Blizzard	0.0m	0.0m	0.0m	0.0m			7.0m	43.0m
Stadia								
YouTube (O&O Revenue)	0.44m	0.27m	0.14m	0.00m	0.3m	0.0m		5.8m
YouTube (Unclaimed UGC Partner Ad Revenue) * Partner means Creator revenue, not YouTube's revenue	18.3m	22.0m	10.0m	\$12.27m* ABK didn't claim UGC, revenue went to the Creator	20.0m	24.5m		
Total	338.4m	580.0m	177.9m	289.6m	335.8m	603.7m	524.5m	841.1m

Google

Calculation details

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Activision Blizzard King Stadia deal for potential inclusion in X-PA deal

Background

Strategic Partnership - Current Status

- ABK is gating Stadia negotiations on first closing this xGoogle deal
- The ultimate goal of a long-term partnership with Stadia and ABK is to bring ABK's top IP to Stadia (Call of Duty, Overwatch, World of Warcraft, Diablo)
- Stadia is currently targeting a small but key one-game deal to start laying the foundation for a broader strategic partnership with ABK

Deal Model

- Total direct deal contribution expected to be -13% ROI (-\$0.6M) in Base case due to uncertain Stadia overall Platform growth
- Deal structure: \$5M recoupable MG w/ 85/15 transactional rev share on this title
 - ABK has made it clear that Stadia unit economics must be at parity or better than what they receive from other consoles
- Tony Hawk series sold ~11M copies through early 2000s console generations. Another recent ABK remaster from that same generation, Crash Bandicoot NSane Trilogy, sold 10M copies over two years (2018-2019).
- Deal model does not capture overall benefit of bringing ABK to Stadia, and potentially advancing Stadia portfolio needs to bring their top premium IP to help grow the user base

Financial Summary

Tony Hawk 2020	Low	Base	High
Global Unit Sales (M)	2.50	2.50	2.50
Stadia Unit Sales (M)	0.05	0.09	0.12
Stadia Sales Capture	2%	4%	5%
ASP + Add-on Content (\$)	\$50	\$50	\$50
Gross Revenue (\$M)	\$2.6	\$4.4	\$6.1
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Project Update

Early results largely aligned with project objectives; several big wins, some challenges

Goal 1: Prioritize Play

Goal 2: Improve Dev Sentiment

Goal 3: Boost xPA Success

Positive - 7 Signed, 10 in redline



Mixed - most happy, some holdouts



"We want to hug you guys" -NCSoft SVP



Moved from launching off Play to pre-reg only on Play. Not signed yet.



Passed on Hug..

Positive - credible xPA uplift



King increased Google Ads wallet share; Niantic deeply engaged



Niantic - inc. commitment +60%; Pearl Abyss - made GCP preferred partner. 10 devs assessing investing in/ increasing spend

Key Result - In 2019, 73 titles (100% launches) from Hug developers sim-shipped on Google Play

Learnings

Everyone loves UAC Credits, incrementality tbd

GCP attractive but complex; huge opportunity for upsell, and new accounts

YouTube value emergent, needs dev education

Risks

Tencent driving coordinated effort across portfolio for better economics.

Google

Slide 29

Samer Sayigh @google.com Lawrence Koh @google.com I heard that Riot is coming back next week on the Redline, is this still considered a "hold out"?

Cyrous Jame, 12/12/2019



Overwatch League (OWL) - bringing the traditional sports model to esports

- Global league entering its third season in 2020, owned and operated by Blizzard (and subsidiary MLG)
 - Income streams: broadcast licensing, ads, sponsorships, and franchise fees (est \$30-60M per team)
 - Major sponsors include Coca-Cola, Toyota, HP, Intel, Bud Light, Xfinity
- 20 city-based franchises owned by outside investors such as Kraft Group (NE Patriots), Kroenke (LA Rams, Arsenal FC), Comcast
 - Income streams: revenue share from ticket sales, physical and ingame merchandise, local sponsorships
 - Prize pool nominal (\$5M in 2019)
- 2019 games were played at Blizzard Arena in Burbank, but in 2020 teams will host visitors in homestand events in their local markets
 - Such as The Novo in downtown LA and Wembley Arena in London
 - Comcast building dedicated esports arena for Philly Fusion (2021)
- Broadcast partnerships include \$90M exclusive 2-year streaming deal with Twitch, and multi-year deal with Disney/ESPN/ABC (undisclosed amt)
 - Avg viewership during season = ~313K (up 18% from 2018)
 - Grand Finals = ~1.1M (up 16%)



- Viewership sources
- <a href="https://www.bizjournals.com/losangeles/news/2019/09/05/activision-blizzard-uses-nielsen-numbers-to-draw.html#":~:targetText=Over%20the%20course%20of%20the,minute%20audience%20of%20313%2C000%20viewers.
- https://variety.com/2019/digital/news/overwatch-league-grand-finals-viewership-2019-1203357584/



Call of Duty World League - replicating OWL with Activision title

- Launching first season in Jan 2020 with 12 teams
- Overwatch League owners were given first right of negotiation, with estimated franchise fee of \$25M
- Notable owners include Kroenke, Cox Enterprises, and Sterling VC (NY Mets)
- Similar home/away format as Overwatch League. Each city will host 2 homestand events over the course of the season
 - Exact locations and broadcast information TBD
- \$6M prize pool, and players are guaranteed a base salary of \$50K plus healthcare and retirement benefits

